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Strict liability for inadequate warning applies even
when vaccines are unavoidably unsafe
by Ellen Sugrue Hyman

In Allison v. Merck and Co., 878
P.2d 948 (Nev. 1994), the supreme
court of Nevada held that a vaccine
manufacturer may be held strictly
liable in tort when it produces a
vaccine that, while beneficial to the
general public, may cause side
effects considered "reasonable" in
light of those benefits. Such liability
may attach even when the product is
properly prepared and marketed.
Moreover, the court held that the
manufacturer cannot avoid liability
by delegating its duty to warn
consumers of potential risks by
contracting with the Center for
Disease Control ("CDC").
Merck's MMR II vaccine
In December 1982, seventeenmonth old Thomas Allison received
the measles, mumps, and rubella
vaccine ("MMR II"). Dr. Del Potter,
a pediatrician at the Clark County
Health District ("CCHD") prescribed the vaccine. Prior to administering the vaccine, Dr. Potter did
not inform Mrs. Allison about the
risks associated with the drugs
because such risks were so low as to
be negligible. Mrs. Allison, however, did sign an information sheet
entitled "Important Information
about the Measles, Mumps, and
Rubella vaccines" at the CCHD.
This sheet contained information
about the vaccine, including the
statement that one out of a million
children vaccinated may develop a
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serious reaction to the drug, including encephalitis (inflammation of
the brain). Three days after receiving the vaccine, Thomas developed
encephalitis which resulted in
permanent blindness, deafness, and
brain damage.
Allison filed suit individually and
on behalf of Thomas against Merck
and Co. ("Merck"), the vaccine's
manufacturer, and the CCHD. In her
complaint, Allison alleged that the
defendants were strictly liable for
injuries sustained by Thomas.
Furthermore, she alleged that the
defendants had both breached their
duty to give adequate warning about
the potential side effects of the
vaccine.
The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants.
It held that the CCHD was not liable
for Thomas' injuries under strict
liability because it was not a seller
of the vaccine. Moreover, it was not
liable for any breach of its duty to
warn because it had met its requisite
standard of care by providing the
informational sheet approved by the
CDC. Similarly, the court also found
that Merck was not liable for
damages as the vaccine in question,
while unavoidably unsafe, was
beneficial to the public and not
subject to strict liability. Furthermore, it held that Merck's duty to
adequately warn of the inherent
dangers of the vaccine had been
properly delegated to the government according to a contract

between the manufacturer and the
CDC. Additionally, Merck was
entitled to immunity under the
government contractor defense.
Allison then appealed the trial
court's decision to the state supreme
court.
Court applies strict liability
On review, the supreme court of
Nevada closely examined the
applicability of strict liability theory
to the facts of the case. The court
noted that Allison, in order to
establish a claim, must prove: (1) a
defect in the vaccine caused the
injuries sustained by Thomas; and
(2) the defect existed when the
product left the control of the
manufacturer. Because the court did
not consider the second factor to be
an issue, it held that Allison could
recover if she demonstrated a defect
in the vaccine had caused the child's
encephalitis.
According to the supreme court,
a product is defective when it failed
to perform in the manner reasonably
expected given the nature of the
product and its intended function.
Here, the court reasoned that the
intended function of the vaccine was
to immunize Thomas against
measles, mumps, and rubella
without causing blindness, deafness,
and mental retardation. Because the
vaccine resulted in such injuries, the
court concluded that it was defective.
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The court stated that its decision
holding Merck strictly liable for its
product was consistent with existing
public policy. It observed that
longstanding public policy considerations supported the principle that
the manufacturer, not the consumer,
should bear the responsibility for an
injury caused by a defective product
as the manufacturer profits from the
sale of the product. Moreover, the
manufacturer is clearly in the best
position to reduce the risks associated with the product and therefore
should bear the ultimate responsibility for injuries resulting from it.
Informed consent and
applicationof Comment k
Merck, in defense of the MMR II
vaccine, contended that it was
exempt from strict liability because
while the vaccine was unavoidably
unsafe, it was not unreasonably
dangerous in light of its utility in
preventing measles, mumps, and
rubella. The manufacturer, in
support of its argument, relied on
Comment k of Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Comment k states that a drug
manufacturer should not be held
liable for risks associated with a
drug's use if: (1) the manufacturer
provides the public with a useful and
desirable product that has known but
reasonable risk; (2) the drug is
properly prepared and marketed; and
(3) proper warning is given.
The supreme court rejected the
application of Comment k in the
present case, finding it contrary to
public policy and inconsistent with
the established law of products
liability. It interpreted Comment k as
granting immunity only if the drug
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consumer accepts a known danger
associated with the drug in exchange
for an anticipated benefit. In such
cases, the court noted, the drug
manufacturer is immunized from
liability for potential injuries
because the consumer has voluntarily taken the drug, cognizant of the
dangers that are associated with her
choice. In this way, the consumer
waives all tort claims and accepts
the risk.
In this case, the court found that
Allison had not made the informed
choice dictated by Comment k. On
the contrary, the court reasoned that
Allison had been compelled by state
law to have her son vaccinated since
the vaccine was required for school
attendance. Refusal to comply with
the state requirement would have
subjected her to criminal sanctions.
Moreover, the court suggested that
Allison may not have consented to
the vaccination had she known the
possible consequences to her child.
Merck had also contended that
imposing strict liability for statistically infrequent injuries, such as
those Thomas suffered, would deter
manufacturers from researching and
developing new drugs. As a result,
greatly needed vaccines would be
unavailable and the incidence of
serious diseases might increase. The
court did not find this argument
compelling. Rather, the court held
that the rarity of the injury was
immaterial and consideration of this
factor was contrary to the basic
rationale of strict liability. Moreover,
the court suggested that if such
considerations were paramount, the
legislature, not the judiciary, should
revise the law.

Failure to warn
Turning to the failure to warn
issue, the court reasoned that even if
Comment k applied to insulate
Merck from liability, Allison would
still be entitled to a trial on the
merits of her claim because a jury
could find that the MMR II vaccine
was unreasonably dangerous as
marketed. The court observed that a
product is unreasonably dangerous if
it is dangerous beyond an ordinary
consumer's expectations. Thus, both
strict liability and Comment k
require that the consumer be
provided with an adequate warning
of the vaccine's consequences. The
court observed that there was
evidence that Merck had knowledge
of the dangers of the MMR II
vaccine, but did not share this
information fully with the consumers. For example, the supreme court
emphasized that neither Merck's
own MMR II package circular nor
the CCHD's information sheet
warned the prospective vaccinees of
the actual possibility of the brain
damage. Therefore, Allison had no
knowledge that the vaccine was
associated with this risk. As a result,
the court concluded that there was
evidence that would allow a jury to
find that the vaccine was not
accompanied by an adequate
warning.
Merck could not delegate its
duty to warn
In reversing the lower court's
holding that the defendants were
entitled to summary judgment on
both of Allison's claims, the
supreme court of Nevada also found
that Merck could not delegate its
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responsibility to warn to the
government through its contract
with the CDC. It reasoned that
regardless of whether the manufacturer or another organization
actually promulgates the warning,
the manufacturer retains responsibility for its contents.
Similarly, the court found that the
government-contractor defense did
not relieve Merck of its liability to
Allison. The underlying rationale of
this defense is that when a product is
designed according to government
specifications, the manufacturer
should not be held for any resulting
defect. The court rejected the
application of the defense because of
its uncertainty about whether it
applied to products such as drugs.
Additionally, the court stated that
there was also a serious question of
fact as to whether Merck had acted
according to government specifications
Accordingly, the supreme court
reversed the summary judgment in
favor of Merck. It remanded the case
for trial on the issues of strict
liability and failure to warn.
Concurrencefinds a genuine
issue regardingsufficiency of
warning
Chief Justice Rose concurred
with the court's opinion. Although
he stated that he found Comment k
applicable in this case, he concluded
that an issue of genuine fact remained concerning the sufficiency
of the vaccine's warning. Therefore,
summary judgment was inappropriate since a factual issue remained
regarding the adequacy of warning.
Moreover, Chief Justice Rose stated
that a vaccine manufacturer should
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not be able to delegate its duty to
warn a third party.
Dissent questions majority's
analysis
Writing in dissent as to the
majority's opinion of the issue of
Merck's liability, Justice Young first
turned to the issue of strict liability.
He suggested that the majority had
erred in its comparison of strict
liability theory to that of res ipsa
loquitur. In particular, he objected to
the majority's conclusion that if
Allison could establish that her son's
injuries were caused by the vaccine,
the vaccine was defective and Merck
was strictly liable. Justice Young
argued that this should not be the
case. Rather, the plaintiff must first
prove that there is a defect in the
product and that this defect made the
product unreasonably dangerous.
Only then would the plaintiff
permitted to contend that the defect
was the cause of the injury. Justice
Young contended that injury alone
was not sufficient to establish a
defect for the purpose of strict
liability.
Furthermore, he concluded that
Comment k should protect manufacturers whose drugs are unavoidably
unsafe but beneficial to society. He
recommended that the court use a
balancing test to weigh the benefits
and risks of such products when the
manufacturer has exercised reasonable care in informing the potential
user of the product's dangerousness.
Applying this reasoning to the case
at hand, Justice Young concluded
that the warnings provided on the
information sheet were reasonable in
light of the medical knowledge
available in 1982.

Justice Young also contended that
a manufacturer's liability should
depend on whether it had reasonably
relied on the product's ultimate
dispenser to provide an adequate
warning. In the present situation,
Justice Young concluded that Merck
had acted reasonably in delegating
its duty to warn to the CDC, an
agency that possesses the most
comprehensive information on the
subject of drug side effects. Additionally, he noted that the CDC
required that state health departments use its information sheets
whenever federally funded vaccines
were administered.
In his dissent, Justice Young
suggested two possible defenses
available to Merck. First, he
observed that the learned intermediary doctrine imposes a duty on the
manufacturer to warn only the
physician who prescribed the
vaccine. The physician then takes
over the manufacturer's duty to
warn in his role as the learned
intermediary. Justice Young concluded that Allison's pediatrician
was the learned intermediary who,
in this role, had failed to warn her of
the potential dangers. However,
Merck had fulfilled its duty to warn
the physician. Second, Justice Rose
stated that the government contractor defense, rejected by the majority,
should shield Merck in this case.
Noting that the defense had been
applied in cases involving drugs, he
stated that it was applicable in
Merck's situation as the government
had considered the design features
of the MMR II vaccine before
granting approval for its nationwide
use.
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